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PUBLIC LAW LITIGATION AND THE
AMBIGUITIES OF BROWN
MARK TUSHNET
Professor Tushnet posits that the Supreme Court's concern for gradually carrying
out desegregation in the public schools ironically gave rise to "'public law litiga-
tion"---an aggressive form ofjudicial review. Specifically. Professor Tushnet ar-
gues that the "all deliberate speed" standard, which separated the right from the
remedy, enabled the courts to become a more powerful institution in shaping so-
cial policy. Throughout his speech, Professor Tushnet provides insight into the
thought processes of the Supreme Court justices at the time of the Brown decision.
W co-panelists have offered views of Brown v. Board of Education
iby participants in that historic litigation. I can offer only the more
modest perspective of a historian, and will attempt to sketch one part of
the story of Brown's importance. As is well-known, the Deep South re-
sisted the Court's decision, through what I call passive resistance-stu-
dent placement plans that amounted to blatant or subtle evasions of
Brown's requirements-massive resistance in Virginia and elsewhere, and
violent resistance, most notably in Little Rock, Arkansas. Although it
took a long time, eventually the Court reacted to that resistance by de-
manding that school boards adopt desegregation plans that promised to
work.
Brown was two decisions, one on the merits2 and the other on the rem-
edy.3 The two decisions, taken together, were suffused with a tension
between two competing visions. In one, the Constitution required only
that government decisions be taken without regard to race. For example,
when Thurgood Marshall was asked about the purported problems that
would arise because of differences in ability between African-American
and White children, he responded, "Simple. Put the dumb Colored chil-
dren in with the dumb White children, and put the smart Colored chil-
dren with the smart White kids."' That is, using test performance to
assign students to schools would not violate the Constitution-even, pre-
sumably, if some of the classrooms that resulted were not racially bal-
anced. According to the Court, this side of Brown required only
desegregation, not integration.5 The most significant consequence of this
vision in the long run was the validation of neighborhood school policies
in circumstances of residential segregation.
Yet, within Brown there was an alternative vision in which the Consti-
tution required students of both races to attend the same schools. This
vision was expressed when Marshall and the Justices began to discuss
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I).
2. See id
3. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown H).
4. Argument: The Oral Argument Before the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of
Education Of Topeka, 1952-55, at 402 (Leon Friedman ed., 1969).
5. See Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955) (per curiam).
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whether desegregation would work. For, if all that mattered was elimi-
nating race from government decisions, it is difficult to understand why
desegregation, defined in those terms, could not work. To determine
whether desegregation was working, the Court began to examine not
whether school boards were assigning students to schools without regard
to race, but whether the schools were truly integrated.
In the immediate aftermath of Brown, southern school systems en-
gaged in a variety of forms of resistance. For example, some school
boards developed elaborate schemes of student assignment in which race
was not an explicit ground of decision, but which effectively delayed de-
segregation for years. These schemes amounted to evasions of the deseg-
regation vision of Brown because they were subterfuges intended to allow
the government to make decisions based on race without saying so and,
of course, they were evasions of the integration vision. The Supreme
Court tolerated these schemes for some years, denying review in a case
from Alabama.6
Passive resistance eventually shaded into the form of massive resist-
ance that took place in Virginia. There, the State adopted a series of
statutes reallocating power for student assignment from local school
boards to a statewide board, effectively removing local boards as defend-
ants in segregation cases, and asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity
against suit on behalf of the only remaining defendant, the State.
Although a credible but ultimately unpersuasive legal case might have
been made to support the passive resistance programs, massive resistance
had no such support. It was simply a way to resist Brown under the guise
of law. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., believed that the legal theory offered to
support massive resistance was "simply legal nonsense,"7 although he re-
frained from publicizing his views. Finally, of course, there was the vio-
lent resistance to Brown that culminated in the Little Rock crisis of 1957
to 1958.
The Court responded with its own "deliberate speed"' to these chal-
lenges. When confronted directly in the Little Rock case, it defended
federal supremacy.9 Passive and massive resistance persisted for nearly a
decade before the Court intervened. Eventually, however, the Court re-
acted to resistance by demanding that school boards adopt desegregation
plans that "promise[d] realistically to work, and ... to work now."" In
taking this course, the Court finally chose between the desegregationist
and the integrationist vision implicit in Brown, deciding to enforce the
latter. "
6. See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 358 U.S. 101, 101 (1958) (per
curiam).
7. James W. Ely, Jr., The Crisis of Conservative Virginia: The Byrd Organization
and the Politics of Massive Resistance 40-42 (1976).
8. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown 11).
9. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1958).
10. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
11. See id. at 437.
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Having adopted the integrationist vision, however, the Court, and par-
ticularly the lower federal courts, discovered that getting plans to work
was not easy. Once the Court directed lower courts to achieve real inte-
gration, those courts began to supervise the operation of schools more
aggressively. After subsequently gaining experience in supervising im-
portant bureaucratic institutions in the school setting, the lower courts
began extending their supervision to other institutions similarly regulated
by the Constitution. The outcome was what Professor Abram Chayes
called "public law litigation," the most characteristic feature of the mod-
em federal courts. 2
Modem public law litigation is widely regarded as a particularly ag-
gressive or activist form of judicial review. Paradoxically, though, it had
its origins in the Court's concern over proceeding too aggressively with
respect to desegregation. Specifically, Justice Frankfurter believed that
since overturning segregation was such a major step, the Court ought to
proceed cautiously.13 Ironically, in following Frankfurter's advice to
proceed cautiously, and acting in what Frankfurter certainly regarded as
a restrained manner, the Court actually set the lower federal courts on a
path that ultimately produced public law litigation.
Prior to Brown, the Court routinely treated constitutional rights as
"present and personal."' 4 A litigant who established injury from a con-
stitutional violation was entitled to a remedy offering relief from the in-
jury, such as damages, or, of more relevance here, an injunction
immediately ameliorating the unconstitutional injury. The Court in-
yoked that "present and personal" concept when it held segregation in
universities unconstitutional.' 5 I believe most of the Justices understood
that invalidating university segregation would start them down the road
leading to the invalidation of segregation of elementary and secondary
schools, as they did in Brown. Justice Tom Clark, for example, con-
cluded a memorandum to his colleagues by explaining his vote against
segregation at the University of Texas: "How will I vote when the...
grammar school cases arise? I do not know.... [But, if] some say this
undermines Plessy [v. Ferguson] then let it fall as have many Nineteenth
Century oracles."' 6
Yet, even at the beginning of the desegregation road, the Court knew
12. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L
Rev. 1281, 1303-04 (1976).
13. See Mark Tushnet, with Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board
of Education, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1867, 1872-75 (1991), for a more detailed development
of the argument that follows.
14. See, eg., Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938) (holding
that a state was obligated to furnish, within its borders, legal educational facilities for
African-Americans "substantially equal" to those afforded to its White citizens).
15. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 635-36 (1950).
16. Tushnet, with Lezin, supra note 13, at 1891-92 (quoting Dennis J. Hutchinson,
Unanimity and Desegregation: Decision Making in the Supreme Court. 1948-1958, 68
Geo. L.J. 1, 90 (1979)). It is possible to read Clark's memorandum as indicating some
uncertainty about the conclusion for elementary and secondary schools, but I believe it is
1992]
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that it would not invoke the "present and personal" concept. The
Court's concern was resistance. The Justices believed that the federal
courts could pull off immediate desegregation of universities, but also
believed that elementary and secondary school segregation was so deeply
embedded in the southern social system that it could be eliminated only
gradually.
The question of gradualism preoccupied the Court for the several years
it considered Brown; it was not an issue that emerged only after the
Court had issued its opinion on the merits. The cases were argued three
times, and in all three the parties discussed the issue of remedy in detail.
"Discussed," though, is a somewhat misleading term. The lawyers for
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
("NAACP"), led by Thurgood Marshall, hammered at the "present and
personal" point. I doubt they truly believed that the Court would, in
fact, enter an order directing immediate desegregation. Rather, they
were playing the cards they had, trying to push the Court as far as it was
willing to go. The "present and personal" doctrine was established law,
followed consistently, and, the lawyers argued, there was no reason for
Brown to depart from it.
The lawyers for the states were in a rhetorical bind. As everyone did,
they knew that the only reason to delay desegregation was the possibility
of resistance. They also knew, however, that it was not a good argumen-
tative strategy to tell the Justices that southerners were likely to resist the
Court's interpretation of the Constitution. These lawyers occasionally
mentioned administrative problems, but everybody knew that "adminis-
trative problems," properly understood, simply meant coming up with
different lists of student assignments-a task that school boards could
accomplish over a weekend. The lawyers for the school boards, there-
fore, danced around the question of resistance, saying instead that deseg-
regation had to be gradual because of administrative or other unspecified
problems. When they occasionally slipped and revealed that the real is-
sue was resistance, the Justices and the NAACP's lawyers, particularly
Marshall, jumped on them.
Inside the Court, too, the Justices faced the tension between being hon-
est about their concerns for resistance and admitting that people might
not go along with what they said. In my view, Justices Black and Doug-
las offered the most sensible solution: require immediate desegregation,
in the sense that every child who applied to attend a desegregated school
with room for him or her would have to be admitted, knowing full well
that where resistance was likely to be strongest, few parents would sub-
ject their children to the inevitable ordeal. That way, Black and Douglas
believed, the Court could continue to adhere to its traditional commit-
ment to the "present and personal" concept, would not compromise on
more easily read as indicating that Clark understood, and was not dismayed by, where
the university cases led.
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fundamental issues of principle, and yet would not really force massive,
immediate changes in southern practices.
Unfortunately for Black and Douglas, the other Justices did not un-
derstand "immediate desegregation" in the same way. The misunder-
standing arose, in part, because Black and Douglas were taking a rather
subtle position in circumstances where subtlety was not highly valued. It
also arose, in part, because of the on-going personality conflict between
them and Justice Frankfurter, who could not tolerate the prospect of
having little influence on the outcome in Brown. Justice Frankfurter
thought that the Black-Douglas position was suicidal, in part because he
did not understand that Black and Douglas expected desegregation to
occur gradually.
In my view, though, Frankfurter was driven by more personal con-
cerns. As the Court considered the desegregation cases, Frankfurter
found that his ally, Robert Jackson, kept insisting that a decision to over-
rule Plessy v. Ferguson 7 would be a political decision. Frankfurter, in
contrast, needed to see such a decision as legal rather than political. In
addition, he had to see that he made an important contribution to the
outcome in Brown. Frankfurter struggled for a while, and he came to
focus on devising a gradualist remedy, which he was able to frame as a
legal question rather than a political one: given the "present and per-
sonal" concept, what resources were available in law to authorize a
gradualist remedy? With Earl Warren on the Court, the substance of the
outcome was certain, and Frankfurter could contribute little to making
the decision unanimous. What he could contribute was the formula for
gradualism-which is why he was so upset at Black and Douglas. Not
only were they wrong, they threatened to read Frankfurter out of the
internal history of Brown.
In the end, of course, Frankfurter prevailed. The "all deliberate
speed" formula he devised had an important impact on future develop-
ments. It implied that relief could be delayed and might not ever come
to the individual litigants. But, as the Court saw it, because the group to
which the litigant belonged would ultimately benefit from desegregation,
no matter how delayed, constitutional restrictions on government power
would be honored in the end. Frankfurter was disappointed when the
South resisted anyway, and persisted in hoping that the good White peo-
ple of the South would turn against demagogues like Orval Faubus. He
should have known better.
And, his innovation, "all deliberate speed," when coupled with south-
ern resistance, transformed constitutional law. "All deliberate speed"
disconnected the right violated from the remedy. It made the Constitu-
tion a mere instrument to accomplish socially valuable ends, not a com-
mitment to the immediate vindication of fundamental-present and
personal-rights. Moreover, it encouraged the federal courts to see
17. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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themselves as managers of programs of social transformation, programs
embedded in what the courts understood to be the requirements of the
Constitution.
Thus, when the South resisted and made the desegregationist vision in
Brown seem unrealistic, the lower courts, aided by the Supreme Court,
shifted to Brown's integrationist vision. Accordingly, the ambiguity of
Brown, the southern resistance to the "all deliberate speed" formula, and
the reconceptualization of the relation between right and remedy all
combined to make judicial intervention a particularly powerful engine in
the daily affairs of government. Frankfurter's restraint, in short, licensed
the very activism that he feared.
